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Logic Locking is an emerging form of hardware obfuscation that is intended to be a
solution to many of the trust issues associated with the modern globalized IC supply chain. By
inserting extra key-gates into a circuit, the functionality of the circuit can be locked until the
correct order of bits or “key” is applied to the key gates. To assess the strength of new logic
locking techniques, we propose a new attack that uses deep reinforcement learning. This attack
aims to test logic locking as well as evaluate reinforcement learning as a possible attack against
logic locking. By using a deep Q-learning neural network, Q-values can be approximated and the
model can be trained much faster than using traditional Q-learning. By allowing the model to
change a single bit in the key each timestep, simulations of the circuit with the key produced can
be run and the outputs can be compared to that of the unlocked version of the circuit, called an
oracle. A reward is calculated based on how many bits of the locked circuit are correct and is
used to reinforce the learning of the model. During the training phases of the model, the
relationship between a highly correct key and how correct the outputs are for some random
inputs is not strong, causing the model to struggle to learn quickly.
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In the age of globalized supply chains, electronics producers are in need of ways to
obfuscate their designs from untrusted foundries. Many design houses have shifted to
outsourcing the fabrication of their integrated circuits (IC) because of the economic feasibility of
using an offshore foundry. The trade-off is the decrease in security and privacy. The use of these
untrusted foundries has led to many security issues such as IC piracy, cloning, and
overproduction. The security flaws in ICs have also allowed attackers to extract sensitive
information from these systems. The ICs at this stage are vulnerable to Trojans, physical
tampering, and logic attacks.This has prompted researchers to develop security mechanisms to
include on circuits to counter these attacks.
Hardware obfuscation is the idea that the structure and logic of an IC are hidden to
prevent adversaries from accessing it [1]. Many forms of hardware obfuscation have been
devel-oped to hide the functionality of an IC. One form of hardware obfuscation is logic locking,
shown in Figure 1. Logic locking aims to protect the IC by inserting key gates to hide the logic in
a netlist. The Inserted key gate is usually in the form of a logic component like an XOR, XNOR,
or MUX. These key gates are inserted between logic components of a netlist and have an input of
a key bit. When multiple key gates are inserted into the design,only a correct key will unlock the
circuit. The key gates actas a buffer when the proper key value is provided. Otherwise,the key
gate will change the logic of the system and generate different output for the IC. This idea adds
an extra layer of security by hiding away the logic and functionality of the design and only
providing trusted entities with the correct keyvalue.
Figure 1: Logic Locking Example
Logic locking provides extra security, but most of these schemes have been broken by
more advanced attacks. Researchers have developed strong logic locking techniques in an effort
to increase security in ICs. These techniques usually provide some type of key or have a golden
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circuit that represents the true design of the system. An attack on logic locking will try to
decipher the key or the golden circuit.There are many types of attacks that have been developed
against logic locking. An oracle refers to an unlocked circuit or a functionally correct circuit
where an input would provide the correct output. Oracle-guided attacks use IO information to
generate an algorithm while an oracle-less attack doesn't rely on an oracle. Structural attacks are
based on using structural analysis to identify components of the system. The information
gathered is used to create an algorithm for the attack. Functional attacks use functional analysis
to determine various properties of the system. The basis of functional and structural analysis is
used in many modern attacks on logiclocking. Over the past several years, various attacks have
been applied to logic locking obfuscation techniques. These attacks are all unique, with some
being simply functional like DoubleDIP [8] or are designed to observe the design structure like
SAIL [6]. Multiple attacks combine both structural and functional concepts. For example, SURF
[2] uses SAIL [6] to predicate a key that is used as the starting point of the key refinement
algorithm. Similarly, FALL [9] uses comparators to identify key gates and their inputs for the
algorithms that solve for the key. Other algorithms take less common approaches, like the Novel
Bypass Attack [3], which uses an extra circuit to bypass the logic locking and fix corrupted
outputs.
We seek to develop our own attack method to further the field of logic-locking attacks,
which is a relatively new area of research. To the best of our knowledge, This is the first use of
reinforcement learning being used in a logic-locking attack. We would like to explore the
viability of reinforcement learning in exploiting hardware security measures in order to publish
our work and allow other researchers to find more robust ways to secure hardware.
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Problem and Objectives
Logic locking is a proposed solution to the trust issues associated with having a
globalized IC supply chain. By having many different companies be involved in the entire
process of designing and manufacturing IC’s, there is opportunity for IP theft, overproduction,
counterfeiting, and piracy. These trust issues end up taking millions from the profits of IC
designers, so a solution is highly sought after. By using logic locking to essentially lock down the
functionality of a circuit so that those who have the key can use it is a promising solution to the
trust issues that are currently faced. As long as the keys are secure and their distribution is
controlled, the IC’s created with logic locking implemented should be unusable by unauthorized
parties. That is unless they are able to determine the key of the given IC. Preventing this will
require a strong and robust logic locking scheme, which needs to be found. Research on logic
locking is split between developing new mechanisms and strategies for implementing key gates,
and new ways to attack logic locked circuits. Eventually, this field will reach a point where a
strong logic locking technique has been developed and is very difficult to defeat, much like RSA
and AES in cryptography.
Our project aimed to help the field of hardware security and logic locking advance by
evaluating a new kind of attack on logic locking as well as test the strength of logic locking and
analyze its strengths and weaknesses. Our first objective was to review existing literature on
logic locking attacks so we could get an idea of how attacks are usually executed and what works
well and what does not, as well as performance metrics that we can use to evaluate our attack.
Once we did this, we were able to write a paper surveying the attacks we researched and had it
accepted into the International Conference on Consumer Electronics 2021.
Our next objective was to choose an attack that was new and hadn’t been done before,
and develop it so that we could get an idea of its performance. Our initial goal was for the attack
to successfully extract the key from a logic locked circuit. We also wanted the attack to execute
quickly. Knowing that reinforcement learning takes a lot of time to train, we didn’t expect the
execution time of the attack to be on the scale of minutes or seconds like other attacks we
reviewed, but had set a target of 2 hours. Our final goal was to look at the data from our attack
and reach some conclusions about it. We wanted to be able to decide if reinforcement learning is
well suited as a logic locking attack and to see how strong logic locking is as a defense
mechanism.
While we did not reach some performance oriented goals, we were able to reach our final
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goal of being able to come to a clear conclusion about the viability of reinforcement learning for




As mentioned earlier, we will be using a reinforcement learning algorithm in order to
carry out our hardware attack. Reinforcement learning is an area of machine learning that seeks
to train intelligent agents to take actions in an environment that maximizes its cumulative
reward. This iterative process is illustrated in Figure 2. At each time step, an agent receives an
observation, which includes the current state and reward. Then the agent chooses an action from
the set of available actions and it is sent to the environment. Then the environment changes in
some way as a result of that action and moves to a new state and the next reward associated with
that transition is determined. This feedback loop continues as the agent learns more information
about its environment and how to make the best actions. For our project, we needed to define our
problem, a logic locking hardware attack, in the context of a reinforcement learning model in
order for this method to work, since reinforcement learning has never been used before in a
hardware attack. At the very least, we needed to define our agent, our environment, what
constitutes an action, how we define a state, and a reward function. These definitions are shown
here:
Agent - Key bits (or the algorithm for finding the key bits)
Environment - Circuit trying to be deobfuscated
Action - Flipping 1 key bit
State -  The values of the key bits
Reward - Output accuracy from a fixed number of inputs with the current key value
compared to the correct outputs with correct key value
Our plan for this project was to design our own logic locking attack using reinforcement
learning. We would then implement this attack on various benchmark circuits using an existing
logic locking technique. For our attack, we were to design and train a reinforcement learning
model, as well as an algorithm around it that will be able to extract the correct key bits from
logic locked circuits. After developing this algorithm, we will need to fine tune the
hyperparameters of this algorithm in order to increase its performance, both in terms of accuracy
and time. We would then collect data from the attacks we run on these benchmarks and compare
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our results to other known logic-locking attacks. We hoped to achieve 100% key accuracy with
this attack, as well as have an execution time that competes with other existing state-of-the-art
attack methods. All of our code was written in Python.
Figure 2: Reinforcement learning feedback loop
Our first task was to obtain the obfuscated benchmark circuits that we would be using to
test the performance of our attack. These benchmarks were provided to us by a colleague, written
in Verilog and already obfuscated. These benchmarks were obfuscated using random, logic cone
analysis, and SLL methods [13].
Our algorithm required the creation of a number of different components that would all
work together. The next task was to create a netlist parser component for our benchmarks. This
netlist parser will be used to extract the input signals, output signals, and key bits from the netlist
files. This parser will be used in conjunction with the simulation manager so that our algorithm
can pass inputs into the benchmark circuits along with the key values that it generates and
capture the outputs.
The next component was the simulation manager. As mentioned, this component acts as
an intermediary between our attack algorithm and the netlist circuit. As our hardware attack
continues to run, it will generate new key values that need to be tested on the benchmark circuit.
The simulation manager will take this key value, along with a number of random inputs, and
generate a Verilog testbench to pass these inputs into the circuit and capture the outputs.
The next component is the oracle comparison. This will take the circuit outputs that were
obtained with a given set of inputs and the key generated from the algorithm and compare them
to the outputs from those same set of inputs with the correct key value in order to generate a
reward for our algorithm. The higher the percentage of output bits that are correct, the higher the
reward will be. Since this initial reward scheme that was generated is a percentage, it’s value will
be between 0 and 1. As you will see later, we slightly modified our reward scheme to try to
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improve the performance of our reinforcement learning model.
The next and most important component of our algorithm is our reinforcement learning
model. The model will be trained by generating key values, deciding actions to take, generating
rewards based on these actions, and passing these experiences into a neural network to learn how
to find the correct key value. This part of the project was created using PyTorch, an open source
machine learning library that allows users to create neural networks for AI applications. All data
that was used by PyTorch’s library functions have a special data type called a tensor. This data
type is very similar to an array or matrix, and it’s used to encode the inputs, outputs, and
parameters of any model created.
There were three main sections of our reinforcement learning model, the deep Q-network,
the epsilon greedy strategy, and the replay memory. In traditional reinforcement learning,
specifically in the type used in our project called Q-learning, how an agent learns about its
environment is by using what is known as a Q-table, where an example with a car moving
through a grid is shown in Figure 3. In this example, one axis has all possible states, which in
this example correspond to the car being in any of the six squares on the grid, and the other axis
has all possible actions, which are the directions up, down, left, and right. As an agent gains
experience by taking actions from different states, a Q-value is determined for each state-action
pair, where a Q-value denotes the future return of taking an action from a given state. The values
in this table will be iteratively updated as the agent continues to explore its environment and find
the optimal path to achieve its goal, reaching the trophy square.
As the state space becomes too large, however, traditional Q-learning becomes infeasible.
The benchmark circuit we’re trying to attack has anywhere from 32 to 256 key bits. Even with
32 bits, that maps to 2^32 possible states, so trying to store a Q-table for this attack, if possible,
would make it extremely slow and inefficient. So we have decided to use deep reinforcement
learning, which combines deep learning and reinforcement learning. Instead of using a Q-table to
store and update Q-values, a neural network is used to approximate the Q-function, and this
network is trained on the experiences of the agent in its environment. The network takes in the
current state, which is the key value, as input, and each output neuron will be the approximate
Q-value for every action that can be taken from the state that was passed into it.
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Figure 3: Reinforcement learning example
Note that in traditional Q-learning, the Q-table is updated by finding the loss between the
calculated Q-value from the current state-action pair and the optimal Q-value, which is given by
Equation 1:
Equation 1
This equation can be interpreted as saying the optimal Q-value for a given state action pair is
equal to the expected value of the sum of the immediate reward from that state-action pair and
the scaled maximum Q-value of the next state among all possible next actions. This scaling
factor is called a discount factor, which takes into account how much the reinforcement learning
algorithm will take into account future returns, which is what the Q-value represents, in relation
to immediate return. In deep reinforcement learning, the loss between the current and optimal
Q-values is used to train the network weights through gradient descent and backpropagation.
Both the current Q-value and the “optimal” Q-value require a pass through the Q-network in
order to be calculated, since we do not actually know the optimal q-values ahead of time. Using
the same neural network to find both values will cause network optimization to be chasing its
own tail, since both the current Q-values and the optimal q-values are being changed at each
training step. We want the optimal Q-values to be somewhat fixed. Therefore, we are using two
neural networks for our reinforcement learning algorithm. The policy net will have weights that
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are trainable based on the calculated loss. The target net will have fixed weights and are used to
find the optimal Q-values, and every certain number of timesteps, the target net weights will be
updated to match the policy net weights. This removes the instability introduced in using only
one network for both values.
We chose to incorporate an epsilon greedy strategy in order to mitigate how the agent
chooses actions, where as mentioned earlier, an action is flipping one bit in the current key value.
This strategy tries to find an optimal balance between two concepts of agents taking actions
called exploration and exploitation. Exploration is the act of exploring the environment to find
out information about it. Exploitation is the act of exploiting the information that is already
known about the environment in order to maximize the return. Both are useful for the agent to
navigate its environment, and using only one of them will not lead to good results. If only
exploration is used, the agent wouldn’t be able to take advantage of the information learned to
optimally achieve its goal, and if only exploitation is used, it might only seek immediate reward,
even though its behavior is suboptimal in trying to achieve its ultimate goal. The epsilon greedy
strategy incorporates both through a parameter called an exploration rate, and the pseudo code
for the strategy is given in Figure 4. At every timestep of the algorithm, a random number is
generated between 0 and 1. If the number is less than the exploration rate, a random action is
chosen (exploration), else the action that promises the highest immediate return is chosen
(exploitation). In our algorithm specifically, determining the action that gives the highest
immediate reward is found by passing the current state into the policy net, and choosing the
action that corresponds to the output neuron with the highest value. To reiterate, each output
neuron in the policy net represents the approximate Q-value, or long-term return, of taking each
action from a given input state.
Figure 4: Action decision pseudocode
The last component of our reinforcement learning model is the replay memory. With a
concept known as experience replay, the agent's experiences at each time step is stored in a data
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structure called the replay memory. An experience is defined as the tuple shown in Equation 2:
et = (st, at, rt+1, st+1)
Equation 2
where st represents the current state, at represents the action taken from that state, rt+1 represents
the reward for taking that action, and st+1 is the new state. A batch of these experiences will be
sampled and used to train the Q-network at each timestep of the algorithm. The main advantage
of using experience replay instead of providing the sequential experiences to the Q-network as
they occur in the environment is to break the correlation between consecutive samples. If only
consecutive samples are passed into the network, the sample would be highly correlated and lead
to inefficient learning.
A complete flowchart of a single timestep of our algorithm is shown in Figure 5. At the
start, the epsilon greedy strategy decides an action for the agent to take in its current state. Then,
that action is executed, and both a reward and a new state are determined. This process
constitutes an experience, and is stored in replay memory. After that, a random batch of
experiences is sampled from replay memory. These experiences are passed into the policy net
and target net in order to calculate the loss. This loss is then used to perform stochastic gradient
descent and backpropagation to train the policy net. We then check if a certain number of
timesteps have passed since our last update of the target net. If it has, we change the weights of
the target net to match those of the policy net. We then move on to the next timestep.
Figure 5: Deep Q-Learning training loop
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Project Outcomes
One of the first things we did to prepare for this project was to read and synthesize
several academic papers about the state-of-the-art hardware obfuscation attacks that exist in the
hardware security industry today. Learning about these attacks not only gave us more knowledge
about the hardware security industry, but many of the techniques used in these papers inspired
aspects of our own attack. After reading about these different attacks, we wrote our own paper, a
survey of all the logic-locking attacks we read about, and submitted this paper to the
International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE). Our paper was accepted to this
conference, and we were able to present our work at this conference virtually in winter of 2021.
Once all of the individual components of our algorithm were made, they had to be
combined together as a full working system. This process involved a bit of modification to how
we initially coded our individual components. Because for the most part many of these
components were created in parallel between each of us, there were some inconsistencies at first
with the data types the modules we created accepted as input and the data types it gave as output.
We tried to be in communication with each other as much as possible as we were creating these
modules to try to avoid these issues. Eventually we were able to make sure the data being passed
around to the different components of our algorithm were consistent and in a state where the
components could actually perform operations on it, allowing us to be able to safely combine all
components in our systems. The block diagram of our full design is shown in Figure 6. The
diagram shows all the major components of our attack and the data that is being passed between
them.
Figure 6: Block diagram of reinforcement learning attack
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There are two phases to our attack: the training phase and the testing phase. The training
phase is what we’ve already explained and requires all components of our system to function.
Through training, the reinforcement learning model should gain more knowledge about the
circuit and the key value as the agent continually performs actions and gains rewards, and this
information is used to modify the network weights in a way that reinforces this knowledge. The
testing phase requires only the deep Q-network and a key confirmation program that calculates
the accuracy of a determined key relative to the correct key value of our benchmark circuits. The
basic flow of the testing phase is shown in Figure 7. Once the policy net finishes training, we
freeze its weights and generate a random starting state. We pass that state into the policy to get its
outputs. We choose the action that corresponds to the output neuron with the highest value, or the
action that has the highest Q-value, and perform that action on the state, which will flip a specific
key bit and give a new state. This new state is passed back into the network, and this process
continues. At each iteration, the key value is passed into the key confirmation program to test its
accuracy, and the testing phase should stop automatically when the key is 100% accurate. A
discussion of further improvements made to our algorithm and the results we obtained are
discussed in the subsequent sections.
Figure 7: Testing phase loop
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Final Design
We had made many improvements to our model and algorithm since when we first
combined our code and initially developed the modules. While many of our improvements were
made with the hopes of enabling our model to learn, they still had fundamental benefits and
reasons for being added. Once we squashed all the initial bugs with our code, the first and most
important improvement we made was changing our reward generation structure. Originally, the
reward that reinforced the neural network was just the average percent of correct output bits from
the batch of simulations that was run in each timestep. However, we noticed that the distribution
of reward and how correct the current key is for that timestep had poor correlation. This can be
seen below in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Key Accuracy vs Reward before new reward function
In order for the model to train effectively, we needed this reward scheme to have a
stronger correlation between the model being in a state that is mostly correct and it receiving a
strong reward. To accomplish this, we combined two new strategies. The first was to increase the
number of simulations per time step. Since the input stimulus for each pair of unlocked and
locked circuit simulations were random, the outputs would also be random. Therefore, for any
simulation regardless of how correct the key being used is (unless that key is 100% correct) then
the circuit’s outputs can be correct to a widely varying degree, as shown by the data in the figure
above. Increasing the number of simulations meant that each timestep would receive a reward
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that is closer to the true correctness of the key. However, this solution still allowed for the
problem of a key that is not very correct, generating a reward that is almost as great as the reward
generated by a key is almost entirely correct.
To mitigate this, we needed a reward scheme that would give out much greater rewards
when the model was in a very correct state, and very small rewards for when the model was in a
largely incorrect state. After some experimenting, we decided to use the following exponential
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average accuracy of the outputs of the simulations in that timestep. This gave a curve that was
more rewarding when the model was in a more correct state, and skewed rewards to be much
greater as state accuracy increased. Below in Figure 9 shows the results of these changes.
Figure 9: Key Accuracy vs Reward with new reward function
This data shows that while we did begin to get a better correlation between the state
accuracy and the reward, we still were not getting exactly the curve we hoped for. One big issue
is that the key-state that is almost entirely correct generates weak rewards. This is due to the
randomness of the outputs. It could be mitigated with more simulations per time step but that
would just add time to our already lengthy training process. We could also just increase the
steepness of the exponential function we are using to generate the reward, but we are unsure
what effect having such a wide range of reward values could have on the training process. But
we believe that we will never get a truly strong correlation between key-state accuracy and the
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reward, due to logic locking and how it unpredictably impacts the circuit outputs. We believe that
this may be one of the larger reasons our model was unable to train and believe that this is a
major reason why the model couldn’t learn.
The second major improvement was changing our activation functions. During our
research we learned about something called the “Dying ReLU Problem”. We originally had built
our neural network using Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) for our activation functions. These units
output a 0 for all values less than or equal to 0, and have a linear function for all values greater
than 0. ReLU has become the most commonly used activation function for deep learning due to
its capability to output a true 0 value. However, this can also cause certain paths of the network
to “die” where they never get updated because they are often 0. This prevents backpropagation
from updating the weights of these nodes and thus the model fails to learn. To remedy this issue,
we changed our ReLU’s to be Leaky ReLU’s. Leaky ReLU’s have a small negative slope for all
values less than or equal to 0, which helps back propagation recover the dead nodes and help
their weights update. In Figure 10 below these two activation functions are compared.
Figure 10: Left: ReLU Activation Function Right: Leaky ReLU Activation Function
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Professional Issues and Constraints
Due to this project being done entirely in software with no hardware components at all
except computers to train the model on, we were largely unconstrained. Our biggest issue was
the lack of facetime due to COVID. Not being able to work together on the project slowed down
progress. We encountered some other issues due to the nature of the project. Since our project is
research based and is using deep learning in a way that has never been done before, finding help
when things went wrong was difficult. Experts we know who are familiar with deep learning or
reinforcement learning were unable to figure out why our model failed to learn. As neither of us
were experts on reinforcement learning before this project, many of the issues we faced we had
to figure out ourselves instead of finding the solution online.
Another issue we faced was the power of our hardware limiting how much we could
train. We originally were using SCU’s Linux machines to train the model, but these machines
were quite slow. We decided to try using one of our personal PC’s had a dedicated GPU with
Tensor cores within it, and a higher speed processor than the Linux machines. Using GPU
acceleration and overall faster PC, we saw a 47x speed up in training over the Linux
workstations. This helped us save a lot of time with training, but reducing training time more
would also have been helpful. There is always a possibility that with more training the model
would eventually learn, but with the current hardware we have that would have taken far too
long to be feasible.
In addition to needing faster hardware, a faster Verilog simulator could have also been of
benefit. We originally started with Synopsys VCS to simulate the circuits, but this was severely
limiting how fast we could train. When moving from the Linux workstations to our personal PC,
we had to install a new Verilog simulator since we couldn’t install VCS locally without paying
for a license. We found Icarus Verilog, which is an open-source Verilog simulator. This simulator
was much faster than VCS and also helped in the massive speedup we saw over the Linux
workstations. Even though Icarus Verilog did speed up the training process, it was still the
limiting factor in how fast we could train. Per timestep of the algorithm, most of the time was
spent waiting for the simulator to respond with circuit outputs, instead of doing operations that
are training the model. Overall, this speedup was massively helpful in working on this project as
it greatly reduced the amount of time we had to wait during training before we could analyze the
data we logged and make improvements to try and get the model to function as desired.
There were no safety concerns associated with our project. Hardware obfuscation attacks
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like these are usually done entirely in software, and that is what we chose to do for our project.
There was no use of any hardware for this project besides the computers we were running the
code on, and so there were no real hazards associated with our work. None of the circuits we
tested our attack on were fabricated ICs. They were all circuit netlists written in Verilog. In a real
hardware attack, however, one would need to use the real ICs if that is all they had access to.
The entire field of hardware security is addressing ethical concerns. The field is seeking
to stop malicious third parties with the intent to steal the intellectual property of chip designers
using hardware attacks. The intent of the hardware attack we developed is purely for research
purposes. Our goal was always to find vulnerabilities in logic locking techniques through our
attack in order to publish those findings so that other researchers can develop more robust
security measures that address those vulnerabilities. We are simply following in the footsteps of
others who have developed strong logic-locking attacks for the purpose of further adding to the




With this project, we sought to design and implement our own logic-locking circuit attack
in order to assess the effectiveness of reinforcement learning  on this type of hardware security
technique. This was the first use of reinforcement learning as a means of implementing a
hardware attack.
We learned current hardware attacks that have already been developed by researchers to
become more knowledgeable on the field, and we compiled that knowledge into a survey paper
that was accepted to ICCE 2021. Inspired by the papers we read, we designed a new hardware
attack using reinforcement learning. We obtained obfuscated benchmark circuits to test our
attack on, programmed the individual components of our algorithm, and combined them into a
complete system. We spent a considerable amount of time fine-tuning the hyperparameters of our
systems as well as making small fundamental improvements to the algorithm with the purpose of
increasing its performance in regards to time and accuracy. Ultimately, this attack was unable to
accurately extract the correct key value from any of our benchmark circuits, showing that
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